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ABSTRACT
Economic psychology encompasses at least three different approaches to the psychological
study ofeconomic problems. In the oldest sense, economic psychology means the psychological
foundations of economic theory. In a second use, economic psycholgy is refen~ed to as a field
of applied psychology. In the third sense, economic psychology is (the beginning of) a separate
discipline, bormwing from both psychology and economics, but working towards developing an
independent theocetical framework that aims at providing descriptions of economic behavior.
The paper reviews historical and current relationships between economics and psychology.
~` 1'his is a revised version of an invited address presented at the IAREPIGEW Joint
Conference, Frankfurt, August 27-30, 1992. I want to thank the convenors of the Conference
for inviting me and Rob Alessie for stimulating commetus on this paper.THE THRF,E MEANINGS of ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Philosophy was for many centuries the parent science of all other sciences. It embraced both
psychology arxi econumics. At some point in time separate disciplines started diverging from
Ihc nciin snurcc. Ax scicikcs cluWay rclalcd lu phil~~u~plty, psyclNilugy aiKl c~:uiwmics h:[d many
cummun interests and une and the same person could give significant contributions to both
sciences. Economics was sometimes seen as a subdivision of psychology and at any rate,
psychological knowledge was held to be fundamental to economic theory. Over the last century,
the two disciplines seem to have diverged more and more. In recent years researehers from
both fields have found that they may again have something to learn from each other.
Psychologists have bec:ome involved in the study of economic behavior, especially decision
making, and c,~cunomists have adopted psychological research methods like the laboratory
experiment and use hypotheses from social and cognitive psychology.
These new crossings of the disciplinary border lines are more than fishing expeditions into
unexplored areas. While many uses of psychology in economics may be seen as fishing for new
explanatory concepts, there are now systematic attempts to utilize interdisciplinary possibilities.
These attempts can be classified under the umbrella label of economic psychology. Economic
psychology actually represents a broad spectrum of attempts to combine knowledge from the
two fields. 1 would like to submit that the concept of economic psychology is used in at least
three senses:
l. The psychological foundations of economics
2. A field of applied psychology
3. A separate field of study.
I shall first make a brief presentation of the three uses, then discuss the historical relations
between psychology and economics, relying mostly on what some prominent economists wrote
on psychological phenomena. This will be followed by some glimpses of present research in
economic psychology and, finally, I shall advance some ideas about the possible future of
ecunomic psychology.
7'hc I'sychological Assumptions behind Ernnomics
Once in a while, authors dealing with the psychological undetpinnings of economics have used
economic psychology to designate the psychological assumption.c underlying economic theory.
The concept is occasionally found in writings by leading economists and historians ofeconomic
thought e.g.SCHUMPETER [1954],HAYEK [1978I1985], and COATS [1976].Generally, the
concept uf economic psychology is employed when there is a discussion of the meaning of the
utility maximi7ation or rationality postulate which is fundamental to economic theory.
TARDE [1902] noted that he launched the concept of economic psychology in 1881 when he
published a critique of economic theory. He conceded that some members of the Austrian
School in economics also used economic psychology in the sense of the psychotogical founda-
tions of economics. In his 1902 text, he seriously criticized Adam SMITH [1776~1982] for being
a poor psychologist, disregarding human interaction, when he formulated his economic theory.
In Tarde's view, Adam Smith was dealing with economic psychology when he proposed that
human actors had an impurtant role in the development of markets. The pursuit of self-
interest, [hc divisiun uf IaMir, arxl lhe exchange ul' guods are tFte basic elements uf hmnan
action according to Smith. In his view, exchange is the main characteristie that distinguishes
humans from animals.2
As economic theory is tcxlay, there is little room for psychology; economies is depsychologized
(COA"fS [1976J ( 1988J). The older KEYNES [1917I1988] stated the independettce of
economics from psychology very clearly: "The bare facts that other things being equal men
prefer a greater to a smaller gain, that under certain conditions they will forego presem for the
sake of future gratifications, and the like, are psychological facts of great economic importance.
But they are assumed by the economist, not established by him. He dces not seek to explain
or analyse them; nor dces he investigate all the consequences to which they lead. Economic
laws in the strict settse are different from the above. They are not simple laws of human
nature, but laws of complex social facts resulting from simple laws of human nature."
(KEYNES ( 1917I1988, 84]).
Mainstream economists still see little room for scientific psychology in the realm of economics.
Recent developments under the label of "behavioral economics", however, involve a more
accepting attitude towards psychology. While the concept ofeconomic psychology is often used
when psychologists deal with economic problems, behavioral economics usually refers to the
attcmpts by economists to include psychological thinking and research methods into the sphere
nf econumics. I:cunomic psychology as eyuivalcnt to behavioral ec;onvmics is a promising
attempt to work with some of the difficulties of presen[ economic theory,. essentially meaning
that economics is provided with more and better descriptive details about human behavior than
what is embodied in the simple psychological assumptions of economic theory.
Economic psychology in the sense ofthe psychological underpinnings ofeconomic theory dces
not necessarily imply tha[ the rationaliry concept is opposed. Despite many objections that can
be raised against the rationality postulate, this paradigm is hard to replace for its elaborate
structure and elegance and for lack of something better. Psychologists can conceivably add to
the discussion by contributing data on cir~cttmstattces under which rationality does or dces not
occur and thus help explain anomalies (THALER, 1992). Their results can to some extent
make irrational behavior predictable (cf. AKERLOF and DICKENS [1982].They can also look
at what constitutes utility, what the relations are between revealed preferences and subjective
utility (cf. SEN [ 1979]). Economists like Gary BECKER [1976] tend to see artonmalies as
minor deviations from rationaliry which can be explained in tetms of rationality or which are
random and thus insignificant. Some economists explore whether economic theory can handle
ihc fowxl anomalics using cconomic rcauming (scx; e.g. MACIIINA [1990]. Psychological
experiments indicating frequent and large deviations from economic rationality, notably
prospect theory (KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY [1979]) have met considerable interest among
economists, but have also met with criticism, based on experimental work by economists. The
results from the psychological studies have been questioned, among other things, for lack of
mundane realism, for non-use of monetary incentives in the experiments, and for disregarding
Ir.irninp, cl'Iccts (u:c c.g.MA('111NA ~1990[;SMITII ~1991];HF.Y [1992].HAUSMAN (1991]
accuses economists of dogmatism and reluctance against new evidettce. He reviews the
preference reversal phenomenon, finds it well established experimentally, and cridcizes
economists for playing it down because it clashes with some fundamental economic theory.
Few economists question the rationality postulate. Many economists today seem to think in
accordance with LAKATOS's [1978] research program. "The basic unit of appraisal must be
not an isolated theory or conjunction of theories but rather a'research programme', with a
conventionally accepted (and thus by provisional decision 'irrefutable') 'hard core' and with a
'positive heuristic' which defines problems, outlines the construction of a belt of auxiliary
hypotheses, foresees anomalies and turns them victoriously into examples, all according to a
preconceived plan." (LAKATOS [1978,110]). In general, Lakatos's thinking about research
programs seems to be gaining wide acceptance in economics (cf. LATSIS [1976]; de MARCHI
and BLAUG (1991]). The basic postulate of rationality is kept as the hard core of economic
theory. Models derived from this postulate can be rejected without any effect on the hard core.
This implies that scientific psychology can never affect the rationaliry postulate. It can very well3
inspire and enter into models in the belt of auxiliary hypotheses. Behavioral economists
actually explore such possibilities.
THALER [1992], however, focusses on a number of anoma[ies in economic behavior which
cannot be explained by economic theory and shows how they can be understood by using
results from cognitive psychology and experimental economics. He cites two reasons for the
avoidance of models with assumptions of less than fully rational behavior. "First, it is not
generally possible to build good descriptive models without collecting data, and many theorists
claim to have a strong allergic reaction to data. Second, rational models tend to be simple and
elegant with precise predictions, while behavioral models tend to be complicated, and messy,
with much vaguer predictions. But, look at it this way. Would you rather be elegant and
precisely wrong, or messy and vaguely right?" (1'HAI.ER [1992,198]) Even though, on the
whole, I opt for the second alternative, I have to admit that with messy models and vague
predictions it is often difficult to know whether one is wrong or right.
If economic psychology is not interpreted as restricted to the simple psychological foundations
of economic theory, but in the broader sense of behavioral economics, there are many
interesting prospects. Economists are increasingly accepting psychological research that
enriches economic models or gives access to new types of data. Typically, these economists try
to comply with or cope with the rationality concept by reinterpreting psychological concepts
so that [he latter become compatible with the rationality postulate. A well-known example is
given by AKERLOF and DICKENS [1982] who developed dissonance theory in rationality
terms and applied it in the study of safety behavior. This theory had earlier been used by
HIRSCIiMAN [1965], an economist who has frequently relied on psychology and especially
on dissonance theory in his discussion of how to make attitudes change in economic
development. THALER and SHEFRIN [1981] give another example with their theory of self-
control and saving. These economists feel free to adopt psychological thinking and tue it in
their models as long as they can make it compatible with the rationality postulate.
It is also possible to use psychology without reflecting on the rationality assumption, for
descriptive purposes. L.EA et al. [1992] pmpose a focus on the consequences rather than on
the axions of rationality which means that psychologis[s leave the rationality concept alone and
concentrate on other issues of relevance to economic behavior. Researchers can use psychology
to elaborate descriptions of behavior or to gather data that provide measures of economic
concepts that are otherwise hard to appreciate. Unfortunately psychology is sometimes used
as a cafeteria in which choices of [heory fragments can be made to fit any preconceived notion
about human behavior and humans.
A Field of Applied Psychology
A second way of defining economic psychology starts with psychological theories as a basis for
the study of economic behavior. Economic behavior is seen as an area of application where
scientific psychological knowledge can be put to test and used for solving a new kind of
practical problems. In a textbook on applied psychology, ANASTASI [1964,277] defined
economic psycholugy as follows: "Abranch of consumer psychology that has been taking shape
since Wurld War 11 is economic psychology. Cutting across the fields of economics and
psycholugy, this area uf research employs some of the data-gathering procedures developed in
consumer opinion surveys and in the [previously discussed] food acceptance methodology. In
its analysis of consumer data, economic psychology combines concepts taken from psychology,
mathematics, and economics."
Anastasi cites some examples of pertinent research. Her first examples concern product
development problems. Given that the price of a product cannot exceed a certain amount,
which quality grade is optimal? She correctly refers to this research as belonging to operations4
research. Another example is taken from a study of ineal preferences assessed through mail
questionnaires dis[ributed to the members of a faculty club. Every day there was a choice
among three differently priced dishes in the restaurant. Combining meal preferences and price
preferences, JONES [1959] was able to make rather accurate predictions of actual choice in
the faculty restaurant. As a research assistant in the Psychometric Laboratory at the University
of Chicago I was involved in the early stages of this study (without knowing that it was
economic psychology). The other ezamples cited by Anastasi are taken from George Katona's
work. They deal with economic attitudes and buying behavior. In the United States, economic
psycholugy is still primarily se;rn as the empirical study of ecotwmic expectations.
In the Preface of the recent Handbook of Consumer Behavior, ROBERTSON and KASSAR-
JIAN [1991,ix] declare:"Few areas in consumer behavior can claim the persistence and
longevity of economic psychology. Based on the work of Katona and the Michigan Survey
Research group, this view suggests that consumer spending patterns are heavily influenced by
consumer expectations of their economic well-being and by cottsutner sentiments (pessimism,
optimism, or confidence)." They add:"Economic psychology was not destirted to enjoy rapid
expansion in the United States. In Europe, however, interest has been steadily growing."
In addition to the study of consumer and business expectations and attitudes, economic
psychology in Europe comprises many other aspects of consumer and business ewnomic
behavior. Commonly, the label of consumer behavior or in some cases consumer psychology
is employed to cover a broad field, usually with close connections to marketing. While
cuirtiumcr tx;h:rvior study has had and to a large cxtent still has a strong managerial orientation,
the econumic-psychological study ofconsumer psychology has more ofa theoretical orientation,
attempting to consttvct more general theory which can serve more purposes than just
managerial uses (see LEA et al. [1987]; van RAAU et al. (1988]). Consumer behavior
researchers may not always like the idea that their well-established field be classified as part
of economic psychology as the tendency is in Europe. They may prefer the view that economic
psychology is restricted to expectations and well-being.
Economic psychology in the applied sense has meant a constant influx of inethods and
hypotheses from basic psychological research. At the turn of the century, there were already
pr~~inincm p~ychnh~t~ixtti wh~~ wnrkrd at Irast part-rime with prohlrms in economie behavior,
roustly with persumxl-sclec;tion oradvertising problems. SCHr)NPNLUG (1993) maintains that
applied psychology has in general been indepettdent of basic research and that there has rather
been an inflow from practice to basic research.
Reuarchers who are interested in developing basic psychological theory should find economic
Ix:h:rviur a Giu:inating Ixhaviural ficld to study. Pcoplc arc gcixrally curu:crrx.~d with ~~:onumic
problems and it is comparatively easy to motivate potential subjects outside college classes to
serve as subjects or respondents. Private economic problems can, apparently be essential
contributory factors to minor and sometimes even major emotional disturbances in everyday
life and to the developing of neumses. Very little research attention in psychology has been
devoted to this area. Somehow psychologists have hesitated to deal with the role of economic
affairs in everyday life. Some developments in the applied field of economic psychology have
bcen important fi~r progress in basic psychology. A lot of theory-oriented research on
judgments, human information processing and decision making is carried out in the consumer
behavior area. Attitude research has received important inputs from consumer behavior studies.
Psychological research is in principle aimed at establishing behavioral laws and at the same
time it is focused on individual differences. Individual differences are the substattce of much
of applied psychology. There is research to select individuals to perform certain tasks, and
there is research on individual reactions to economic stimuli. The question is often: under what
circumstanc;es dues Y follow from the occurrence of X and under what circumstartces dces Z5
follow? This means that in economic psychology the idea is to look at segments, chatacterized
by different psychological circumstances, for example consumers who have different attitudes.
Each segment is homogeneous with respect to a psychological characteristic whereas there are
significant differences between segments.
When economic problems are studied by psychologists, the focus lies on the use of psychologi-
cal thinking with little regard for economic variables. Economic psychology in the true sense
of the study of what influences economic behavior should be genuinely interdisciplinary using
both economic and psychological variables and models based on theory from both fields. More
psychotogists working on economic behavior problems with a view towards developing
psychology would, however, give helpful contributions to economic psychology as an applied
field. The applied field can be better served with new theories, models, and methods. if basic
psychological research devotes more interest to economic behavior.
Economic Psychology as a Special Feld of Study
A third way of viewing economic psychology is to treat it as a science on its own, combining
psychology and economics and fotTnulating theories that tie the two disciplines together. The
focus is on the study of economic behavior and includes the study of the individuallthe
houschold as wcll as decision makers in business and in the public sector. George Katona who
was by his first training a psycholugist and later studied ec:onomics instituted the 13rst research
program in economic psychology. After a career as an economic joutnalist and investment
advisor, he fell ill and had to change to something more quiet so he again statted to do
psychological research. His specialty was to utilize Gestalt theory in the study of tearning and
problem solving. His "Organizing and Memorizing" is a classic in the field and still widely cited.
When World War II broke out, Katona used some of his psychological knowledge to warn
against uncontrolled inflation, which he had experienced in Germany after the fust World War.
His book "War without Inflation" aroused interest among some leading economists. He was
offered a job with the Cowles Commission which had the task of conducting research that
could help solve the problems of a war and after-war economy.
In the middle 1940's Katona started a research program that involved asking consumers and
businessmen alwut their expectations of their own financial status and the national economy.
Katona first used economic psychology to designate the new field, but later changed to
psychological economics and even later to behavioral economics. Economic psychology then
fx:came identilïed with the empirical study of expectations and attitudes regarding eeonomic
problems. 'fhe use of such studies quickly spread to other countries and became the concern
of economists and to some extent statisticians. Katona's research, however, comprised much
more than the study of expecta[ions. It included saving, consumer spending habits, saving
motives, attitudes towards inflation, and consumer motivation in general.
Katona was highly critical of abstract economic theory. He was mainly concerned with
macrceconomic issues like the sales of durable goods, saving, and inflation. He complained that
economic theory made completely wrong assumptions about behavior at the micro level so that
aggregate predictions were mostly wrong. Economists tended to overlook the fact that most
consumer hheavior was based on routines and that the factors influencing genuine decision
making were important to study empirically. He seems to have become more and more
convinced that it was necessary to build up a special field of study (see e.g. KATONA [1975,
1979]. He advocated an economic-psychological theory that was descriptive and low-level, i.e.
close to empirical observations. This theory would be a valuable complement or even
replacement of the abstract economic theory and the empirical research based on it. Similar
ideas about the role of psychology as provider of data on actual economic behavior is found
in SIMON [1986].6
In Europe, economic psychology is now usually defined as the psychological study ofeconomic
Ix:havior at diffcrcnt levels of aggregation, from the individuallhousehold to the decision
makers at Ihe macnx,~c;orwmic level, and of factors influencing sueh behavior. It is mostly
associated with the study of consumer behavior in a much broader sense than in Katona's work
and it is thus in this respect similar to consumer psychology. The field also covers a number
of other areas such as the psychology of saving, fiscal psychology, entrepretteurship, and
unemployment. A distinction is often made between macro- and micro-economic psychology.
Reviewers of recent publications in economic psychology have pointed out that there is no
coherent framework. In fact, Katona had a simple micro model which was useful also at the
macro level: savinglconsumption is dependent on ability to savelconsume and willingness to
savelconsume. Consumer ability to savelconsume is defined as disposable income and willing-
ness is assessed through interview data on financial expectations and attitudes. Later attempts
at providing a more integrated framework for the field have been done, the most advanced one
being the work by LEA et al. [1987] who try to combine psychological and economic reasoning.
When economic psychology is intetpreted in this way it appears as a new field of study that is
neither completely within the bounds of economics nor completely within those of psychology.
It is notable that some of the professorial chairs in economic psychology are in psychology
departments whereas the rest are in schools of business or in economics departments. The
question about what road or roads economic psychology will be taking in the future is complex.
What I shall deal with in the following mainly belongs to the area of macro-economic
problems. First, some of the historical roots of economics and psychology are traced. The
purpose is to sift out some ideas for the future of economic psychology in the three senses
presented above. While the study of consumer behavior atà influences on such behavior is
well-established and accepted as an integral part of economic psychology, much more remains
to be done in the area of macroeconomic psychology.
EARLY ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY
Economics as the Study of Self-Interest, Pleasure and Pain
The economic science was by ARISTOTLE [undatedl1976] said to have wealth as its end. The
science dealt with household and property management. Economics which was early called a
scierx;e in addition, like psychology, comprised practical knowledge and was prac[iced outside
of the supremacy of philosophy. Psychology was for many cen[uries a fundamental part of tnany
other sciences and was taught within and as part of those (SCH~ NPFLUG, 1993). There thus
existed applied psychology that was quite independent of philosophy and the more theoretical
thinking about psychological problems, mostly consciousness and mind-body problems, in the
parent discipline.
Some of' the best discussions of psychological problems relating to economic behavior can be
found in the publications ofthe classical and early neoclassical economists. Before Adam Smith
economics was a sciettce without human actors. There wete two dominating schools. The
mercantilists studied foreign trade and stressed its importance for a national economy. The role
of the government was confined to controlling trade and in a way serving the merchants. The
physiocrats who were mainly French saw agriculture and mining as the only real sources of
wealth generation whereas all other ac[ivities were parasitic. The only role for government was
lo makc surc Ihat properly was secure.
ADAM SMITH (1776I1982) introduced psychology in political economy by stressing the good
consequences ifman pursued his self-interest (self-love) and heeded some natural instincts. The
forces of the market would then take care of creating a balanced economy--the work of the
invisible hand. TARDE [1902J accused Smith of having forgot[en the psychology he espoused
in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments", when he wrote "The Wealth of Nations". Smith was7
blamed for missing the fact that humans were social beings, interacting with others, and not
exclusively pursuing their self-interest. For many years both before and after Tarde it has been
hcld thai Ad~un Smith changed his concept of man from The Theory of Moral Sen[iment to
'1'he Wealth of Nations. Whereas 5mith in the former book stressed consideration of other
men's happiness in the pursuit of one's own happiness, he apparently spoke in favor of self-
interest as the guiding principle in the latter.
SMITH [ 1759] talked about three components of virtue: prudence, benevolence and justice,
and self-command, while SMITH [1776,119] asserted "It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest. We address ourselves, not [o their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to
them of our own necessities but of their advantages." Smith here praised the effects of division
of labor and according to more recent thinking this involved no disregard for bettevolence.
There is no incongruity between the first book and what is said in the la[er book according to
the editors of SMITH [1759I1982,20-25]. They note that Smith himself did not see any
difference. HAYEK [1978I1985,268] says: "It is an error that Adam Smith preached egotism:
his central thesis said nothing about how the individual should use his increased product; and
his sympathies were all with the benevolent use of the increased income. He was concerned
with how to makc it Ixissible for lxople to make their contribution to the social product as
large as possible and this he thought required that they were paid what their services were
worth to those to whom they renclered them."
Bentham and utilitarianism focussed the interest of political economy on the problems for a
government to create maximum happiness for its population. Self-interest was held to be the
only motivation of human action and hedonism became the main psychological tenet of
economics. Bentham and utilitarianism proclaimed the greatest good of the greatest number
of people and saw this as a fulfillment of the self-interest. Each individual was assumed to be
driven by the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, but also respecting the greatest
good of the greatest number. In this manner, utilitarianism could be the foundation both for
economic theory and for ethics. Later authors have found it more difficult to reconcile self-
interest and hedonism with utilitarianism (see e.g. discussion by SEN [1979]).
Economics, mostly called political economy, became the science that dealt with human pleasure
and pain. JEVONS [1871] and BOHM-BAWERK [1888] although using somewhat different
words both saw economics as the study of pleasure and pain which involved the study of human
emotions. In a patisage on economics and ethics JEVONS [1871I1911,23] described economics
as fulluws: "'1'he theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain; and
the object of Economics is to maximiu happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it were, at the
lowest cost of pain." B~ HM-BAWERK [1888] described the subject matter of his field in tetms
of happiness that are clearly related to feelings of pain and pleasure, at the same time as he
rejeclcd Iwdonixm and utililarianism. Many contemlxirary psychologists were alui interested
in pleasure and pain, but mostly the more physiological aspects. Later, the experimental
psychologists working on learning adopted the label of reinforcement to designate the effects
of pleasurable or painful events. BORING [1950] refers to this as "a hedonism of the past"
meaning that these psychologists were not interested in intentions ("hedonism of the future"),
but rather in consequences after rewards and punishments. Reinforcement is st911 an important
concept in the psychology of learning, especially in SKINNER's [1974] theory which has had
some acceptance among economists (ALHADEFF [1982]).
In his introduction to "Principles of Economics", MARSHALL [1890I1947,1] said that
economics is both a study of wealth and a branch of the study of man. "POLI1'ICAL
ECONOMY OR ECONOMICS is a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life; it
examines that part of individual and social action which is most closely cottttected with the
attainment and with the use of the material requisites of wellbeing." This is still a highly8
psychological phrasing of the subject. It is noteworthy that Marshall used the words "A study
of mankind in the ordinary business of life",presumably to distinguish the subject matter from
that of psychology. The science of psychology was at that time still closely related to problems
raised in philosophy rather than in everyday life.
EDGEWORTH [1881I1967], an economist who is sometimes mentioned also in the history of
psychology took up to a critical scrutiny Jevons's idea of economics as the sciettce of pleasure
and pain. He asked for numerical measurements for the mathematical reasoning to be
meaningful. "Professor Bain has shown(1] how one may correct one's estimate of one's
pleasures upon much the same principle as the observations made with one's senses; how one
may correctly estimate the pleasures of others upon the principle 'Accept identical objective
marks as showing identical subjective states', notwithstanding personal differences, as of
activity or demonstrativeness. This "moral arithmetic" is perhaps to be supplemented by a
moral differential calculus, the Fechnerian method applied to pleasures in ge~ral. For Wundt
has shown that sensuous pleasures may thereby be measured, and, as utilitarians ho(d, all
pleasures are commensurable. The first principle of this method might be: Just perceivable
increments of pleasure, of all pleasures for all persons, are equatable." (EDGEWORTH
[188111967,60]).
As a support for his contention that utility can be measured, Edgewotth thus cited Fechner,
Bain and Wundt, all three of whom are classified as psychologists in the history of psychology,
although Fechner was a physiologist, Bain like Jevons a logician, and Wuttdt a medical doctor
and philosopher. Edgeworth treated the Utilitarian Calculus of pleasure which was the basis
for ethics as something separate from the Economical Calculus of Pleasure, which was the basis
for economics. Earlier the two were treated as belonging together, but Edgeworth saw them
as distinct. Attempts are nowadays being made of bringing ethics and economics closer
together again (e.g. SEN [1987]; ETZIONI [1988]).
It is interesting to compare the economists' notions of feelings of pleasure a~ pain as needing
no definition and the psychologists' efforts at about the same time to establish the true nature
of feelings and emotions. The psychologists were influenced by the physiologists in their dealing
with such maucrs. WILLIAM JAMIS ~1890~ who Ix:came widely known for his "Principles of
Psychology" which was published in 1890, is also known for his theory of feelings and emotions
which was based on physiological assumptions and his own work in the laboratory (the James-
Lange theory of emotions).
Developments in Economics and Psychology in the Early 1900's
It has been said that when economists staRed to develop abstract theory, economics took an
important step away from history: it became a science which could make predictions
(MANICAS [1987]). And it has made predictions. FRIEDMAN [1953] asserts that the ttve
measure of the value of economics is the accuracy of the predictions it makes. History did not
give up that easily. Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was a"Methodenstreit"
in Germany involving Carl Menger who was in favor of abstract reasoning and Friedrich
Schmoller who represented the historical approach (CALDWELL [1986]). To some eztent the
History School has returned into focus with institutional and evolutionary economics
(HAUSMAN [1988,37]).In the Anglo-Saxon countries there was a fight between psychology
and economics in which some economists grabbed arguments from the well-known
psychological works of William James, William MacDougall and John Watson (see COATS
[ 1976]).
FLORENCE [1927], a British economist, who was on the whole favorable towards using
psychological theories in economics, rejected McDougall's theory of instincts as a foundation
for economics. He did this on the ground that instincts left no room for considering costs or9
sacrifices. Some deliberation of utility versus costs and other sacrifices was according to him
a necessary feature of consumer choice. Later, attitude theories have been criticized for
disregarding the cost or sacrifice aspects of behavior attd for too much concentration on
benefits. To some extent this criticism has been valid, but it should be noted that the attributes
measured according to leading attitude theories comprise both costs and benefits and models
like the new "Theory of Planned Behavior" combine attitudes with such variables as social
norms and perceived control to predict behavior (see AJZEN [1991]).
A decisive blow to the role of psychology was dealt by ROBBINS [1935~1979]. He discussed
the nature of economics and formulated a much-quoted defuution of economics: "Economics
is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means
which have alternative uses." The defïnition dces not mention need satisfaction which had
earlier often been part and parcel of definitions of economics. This illustrates the fact that
Robbins was hostile towards the science of psychology. He was particularly emphatic in his
rejection of Behaviorism which in his view had misled some economists into rejecdng the
economic theory of subjective value as rwn-scientific since value could not be observed. Like
many other economists Robbins referred to common-sense psychology as a support for the
rationality postulate. "All that we need to assume as economists is the obvious fact that
different possibilities offer different incentives, and that these incentives can be atranged in
order oftheir intensity."(ROBBINS [1935I1979,40]).Robbins ttanslated the rationality concept
into something that was a pure logic of choice, with the main emphasis on consistency. It just
involved knowing one's preferences and acting in accordance with them. Conttary to what is
often assumed, Robbins made some room for apparently inconsistent behavior: "The marginal
utiliry of not bothering about marginal utiliry is a factor of which account has been taken by
the chief writers on the subjective theory of value from Biilun-Bawerk onwards." (ROBBINS
[1935I1979,42])
Mainstream cx:onomics has developed a rather strict paradigm for research. CALDWELL
[1986,10]gives the following description of the typical procedure in economic research: "Ifone
were to reflect on what comprises scientific procedure in economics, the following set of
instructions might emerge: Find a problem, model it as a maximi7ation problem, derive some
testable hypotheses (the predictions of the model), find empirical proxies for the theoretical
constructs, do the econometrics, get your results. (It might well be added: If the results agree
with the model, publish them; ifnot, find out why,and then publish them)." Caldwell notes that
in the SO's and 60's, many macroeconomists did not follow this paradigm of Friedman's since
lhcir m~xlcls did not yicld any tcstahlc propusitions.
Kant (BORING [1950]; DANZIGER [1990,19]) had declan~i that psychology could never
become a science because psychology could not use mathematics nor experiments. Kant's
successor Herbart showed tha[ psychology could use mathematics so one step towards making
psychology a science was taken. When psychologists started becoming oriented towards
physiology, the experimental method and mathematics turned out not to be a problem. The
birth of scientific psychology is often dated to 1879 when Wilhelm Wundt founded his
laboratory in [.eipzig. His work in the laboratory was essentially a combination of physiological
psychology which had received an important push forward through Fechner's work published
in I8fi0 arxl John Stuart Mill's work on associationism. Associationism statts wi[h supposedly
irreducible mcntal elements atxf assumes that learning and the development of higher
pnxesses consist mainly in the combination of those elements. So mind-body relationships and
consciousness were the main preoccupation of the new psychological science. Tbe approach
meant that stimulus-response associations were seen as purely mechanical. This view was
further enharn;ed in Watson's Ix:haviorism atxl reached its apogc:e in Skinner's operant
conditioning theory (SKINNER [1974]).10
PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS: A BRIEF OVERV)EW
ROBBINS [1935] and many other economists emphatically reject the possibility and desirability
of relying on scientific psychology; reliance on everyday experience suffices for making the
simple psychological assumptions in economic theory plausible. Also according to ARROW
[1963, 738], economic theory is fundamentally based on observations that are non-sciendfic in
most psychologists' eyes. "The whole axiomatic approach can be thought of as crystallizing
everyday or introspective observations." When the early economists discussed psychological
problems that were taken from everyday life and out of concern with societal issues, they freely
used introspection. The contemporary psychologists were preoccupied with research problems
inspired by philosophy, but typically rejected introspection as inferior to the experimental
method.
To what extent did the early economists use the results of scientific psychology? This is perhaps
not a relevant question judging from what SCHUMPETER [1954,27-28] said in his "History
of Economic Analysis". He attacked the view that psychology was the basis from which
economics like every other social science must start and from which all fundamental
explanation must be taken. "Actually, however, economists have never allowed their analysis
to be intluenced by the professional psychologists of their times, but have always framed for
themselves such assumptions about psychical processes as they thought it desirable to make.
On the one hand, we shall note this fact occasionally with surprise because there exist problems
in economic analysis that might be attacked with advantage by methods worked out by
psychologists." He then gces on to explain that using a psychic fact dces not mean borrowing
anything from professional psychology. "..Iam simply formulating what righUy or wrongly I
believe to be a fact of common experience. If we place ourselves on this sta~point, we shall
find that there is much less of psychology about economic propositions than one might think
at first sight."
While Schumpeter devoted considerable attention to professional psychology in his history of
economics, his view is at the end quite similar to that of Robbins. Schumpeter was more
concerned about the neglect of what he, following Max Weber's lead, called economic
sociology. He distinguished between three component parts in economics: economic theory in
which he included statistics, economic history, and economic sociology. He conceded that the
use of psychoanalytic theory could be very useful in economic history.
Schumpeter was probably right in his assertion that the economists used professional
psychology when they found it useful, and that, mostly, they did not fud any use for it. Did
they then mainly depend on common-sense psychology? First, a few words should be said about
what scientific psychologists think about common-sense psychology. FLETCHER [1984,204]
defines common sense in the following manner: "a cultural group's body of shared beliefs
about the world". Common-sense psychology is then psychological beliefs that are shared by
some cultural group. According to this view it can be studied through everyday language
(ordinary language). Psychological knowledge has always been an ingredient in everyday life
and more or less taken for granted and psychological science has had difficulties of fuiding its
way with common-sense psychology. The latter is partly more advanced, partly lagging far
behind scientific psychology according to a recent source (KELLEY [1992]).
Psychologists have a tendency to be somewhat doubtful about common-sense psychology. This
is mainly because it is too easy to be unaware of the influence of common-sense psychology
on psychological research and especially on its influence on interpretations of results.
FLETCHER [1984,203]concludes that"..common sense isavaluable but inherently dangerous
resource available to psychologists." This may also hold true for economists using common-
sense psychology. SKINNER [1974.234], like most behaviorists, was very hostile towards
cottunon-sense psychology:"The disastrous results of common sense in the management of11
human behavior are evident in every walk of life, fmm international affairs to the care of a
baby, and we shall continue to be inept in all these fields until a scientific analysis clarifies
the advantages of a more effective technology. It will then be obvious that the results are due
to more than common sense."
If common-sense psychology is defined as above, it is probable that the classical and
neoclassical economists did not entirely depend on common-sense psychology. Psychology did
not exist as a scientific discipline that could give answers to questions concerning those
problems that were of greatest concern to economists. Every social science and natural sciences
like medicine had their own psychology (SCHO NPFLUG [1993]). Observations of psychologi-
cal phenomena were made by other disciplines while the philosophers who were interested in
psychology were devoted to exploring more abstract thinking. Those who needed psychological
knowledge often made rather astute observations of human behavior and were more discerning
than the philosopher-psychologists. In certain periods, there were similarities in the thinking
of economists and scientific psychologists. SCHUMPETER [1954] attributed these similarities
to phraseological influences and the effects of Zeitgeist rather than to actual influence fmm
psychology.
There are all the same some differences in how the early economists related to what was
contemporary scientific psychology. Was Adam Smith depending on common-sense psychology
or on more systematic observation when he wrote the following passage which is essentially the
contents of prospect theory ([KAHNEMAN and TVERSKY [1979]): "We suffer more, it has
already been observed,[..) when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy
when we rise from a worse to a better. Security, therefore, is the first and the principal object
of prudence. It is averse to expose our health, our fortune, our rank, or reputation, to any sort
of hazard." (SMITH [1759I1982,213]).
Orx~ way for economists to deal with psychology was to cite as support for their reasoning
about human behavior ideas and results from the works of psychologists. JEVONS [1871], for
example, cited his colleague Alexander Bain who is considered to be the fust British
psychologist. He did so in many contexts and in particular when discussing feelings and
emotions as part of developing marginal utility theory. As indicated above EDGEWORTH
[ 1881] who contributed to economic [heory by elaborating it on the basis of mathematical
physics, referred to psychological research results from Fechner, Bain and Wundt, sometimes
criticizing them.
A different approach to psychological science was taken by B~HM-BAWERK [1888]. He
made careful observa[ions himself. This is still typical of the Austrian school, but the members
of the School may, however, be accused of annchair psychologizing rather than heeding the
findings of scientific psychology. Bdhm-Bawerk gave an excuse for daring to deal with
psychological issues. He complained that professional psychologists were as yet devoting little
attention to the psychological problems that were of interest to the economist. His colleague
M1:NGER ~ 1871 ~ did not cite any psychological research, but developed some psychological
theory of his own, a need hierarchy which is similar to the (overused) one of Maslow. It is said
that some Austrian psychologists were inspired by Menger's marginal utility theory to use the
ideas in their study of religious behavior (SCHUMPETER [1954]). PARETO [1909] more or
less developed his own psychology and he said that the attempts to refer to Fechner's law as
a support for the idea of diminishing utility was unnecessary. Except for that he seems to have
given few references to psychological science in his economic texts. According to ALBOU
~ 1984) there is still a lot to learn from Pareto's reasoning for researchers in economic
psychology.
It would seem that some economists like Jevons, Edgeworth attd Marshall who developed the
mathematical approach to economics were more inclined to cite the results of the science of12
psychology. They somehow took the substance of their theory from psychology and used it as
an argument and a support for the chosen mathematical form. As we all know, the psycholog-
ical substance gradually lost in import and mathematics came to prevail. Psychology disap-
peared more and more from economic contexts, in spite of protests based on in turn
experimental psychology, McDougall's theory of instincts, and Watson's behaviorism and its
followers.
FISHER [1930] used psychological concepts in his development of economic theory. In his
discussion of the factors that determined interest rates, he talked about subjective or psychic
income and he suggested that impatience be used instead of time preference when spending
versus saving was discussed. COATS [1976] mentions that Fisher in his doctoral dissertation
treated the potential role of psychology in economics and found that the developments in
scicntific psychology were of little use. Fisher did not make any explicit references to scientific
psychology. According to him, a major source of psychological ideas was a book by John Rae
"The Sociological Theory ofCapitai" (RAE [1905]). This book was written by an educator with
some background studies in medicine and political science and was first published in 1834
under a different title and was according to the author meant to be a critique of The Wealth
of Nations. It contains a discussion of the desire to accumulate wealth that had influence on
such economists as John Stuart Mill, BcShm-Bawerk, and Marshall.
To conclude this somewhat arbitrary selection of economists, I would like to say a few words
about KGYNES (1936) as he appears in his main opus. He stated: "..the psychological law
upon which we are entitled to depend with grea[ confidence both apriorifrom our knowledge
of human nature and from the detailed facts of experience, is that men are disposed, as a rule
and on the average, to increase their consumption as their income increases, but not by as
much as the increase in their income." (KEYNES [1936,96].This sounds like common-sense
psychology, but may be based on more than casual observation. SCHUMPETER [1954] called
the law a statistical fact which it was unnecessary to give the rank of a behavioral law. Keynes
did not refer to psychological science in this or any other context in the book, but he
mentioned psychological factors quite frequently without giving any precise meaning to them
except as used in everyday language.
In some contexts Keynes used the concept of animal spirits to designate what many other
authors call psychological factors. He defined it as a kind ofspontaneous op[unism that makes
entrepreneurs invest money in their ideas. Interestingly, Keynes may have been influenced by
psychoanalysis when he formulated some of the ideas in his General Theory (WINSLOW
[1986]). In one of his earlier works "ATreatise on Money" he discussed some of Freud's ideas
in footnotes, but in his General Theory he did not at all refer to psychoanalysis. Winslow finds
inciirect evidence for psychoanalytic influences in Keynes's discussion of liquidity preference
(anal fixation) and of animal spirits.
HAYEK [1978l1985,284]) who like Schumpeter was not much of an admirer of Keyrtes said
about Keynes:"Widely read as Keynes was in many fields, his educadon in economics was
somewhat narrow." It appears that Keynes knew much more about psychoanalysis than about
psychology (WINS[.OW [1986]) except for his own psychological observations. He was after
all engaged in practical affairs where he could make observations and he had many friends
who were observers of society and human behavior (the Bloomsbury gmup).
Once the psychological founcíations of economics were laid down, there was little room for
psychology. The idea that characterizes economics is that economic theory is and can be based
on a simple psychological law that will hold over [ime and space. Ifpsychological science digs
up new findings that lead to questioning this law which agrees with common sense, such
findings will rather be a problem for psychology than for economics. There are economists and
others who have wanted to reject the rationality postulate and completely rewrite economic13
theory. SCITOVSKY [1976], [1986] is a notable example and so are AIHADEFF [1982] attd
MAITAL [1982]. Their efforts have not been met with much enthusiasm by their economist
colleagues.
This selection of economists who have dealt explicitly with psychological assumptions in their
verbal treatments of economics is not meant to prove or even suggest that the psychological
rcasuning of th~a: c~conomists has been in any way essential to the development of economic
theory as it appears today. The fact that psychological phenomena were dealt with in verbal
contexts may even have facilitated the abandonment of psychology since this ptrovided means
of assuming away psychological phenomena. The increasing focus on equilibrium theory,
indifference curves and revealed preferences saved economists fmm having to pay attention
to individual idiosyncracies of human beings. The interesting fact to note is that economics now
has finally reached the stage where serious use is found for results and methods from scientific
psychology.
Economics Used by Fsychologists
Despite the common charge, especially fmm socio~conomists, that economics is an imperialis-
tic science, economic models have not penetrated into other social sciences to any dominating
extent. There are areas where economic thinking has gained some acceptance such as public
choice theory in political science and some areas in sociology where the rationality concept is
exploited (COLEMAN [1990].There are few examples of such influence on psychology, except
in the study of decision making. This bold statement dces not agree with the theme in, for
example, RADNITZKY and BERNHOLZ [1987], but I have a feeling that there is often a
confounding of economists' influence on society and their (much smaller) influence on other
social sciences.
As noted earlier there was some influence from the early Austrian economists on contemporary
psychologists. MENGER's [1871] ideas informed some study of religious behavior. It is said
that Btihm-Bawerk's work influenced [he Austrian act psychologists who later reached fame
as Gestalt psychologists (ENDRES [1987]). Their opposition against the elementism and
atomism that characterized experimental psychology had some similarities with what Bt7hm-
Bawerk asserted about the contemporary psychologists in his book on capital.
ARROW [ 1963,726] suggests ihat Freud was influenced by the Austrian economists ofhis time
when he formulated his theory of libido and what was called "the economic principle" of
balance between the ego and the id. "Freud's use of the term 'economic' in his discussions of
metapsychology is remarkably precise. He is referring to the allocation of the scarce resources
of the libido among competing uses, just as the individual allocates his scarce income among
competing commodities. It might be interesting for the historian of thought to see what, if any,
influence the thought of economists had in Freud's development. Vienna in the 1870s and
1880s was the cen[er of a great school of economists who were very much intenested in the
utility theory--irxieed, this group was one of its originators."
In recent years, there has been more communication between the fields of psychology and
economics in certain research areas. Research on decision making under risk and uncertainty
is nowadays truly interdisciplinary. A first presentation of economic artd statistical research on
decision making under risk and uncertainty to psychologists was made by EDWARDS [1954].
His article aroused a lot of interest among psychologisu for experimental work in the area.
Herbert Simon has had considerable influence on cognidve psychology, but not as an
economist, rather as a computer scientist.
FFURSH et al. [1987J represent a new field within psychology which they say is heavily
influenced by economics: behavioral analysis. These authors have found economic theory an14
inspiring source of concepts and ideas for their psychologícal research which belongs to
Skinner's tradition. An early account of this common grouncl was given by LEA [1978}.
AINSI.II: ~ 1975~ rclicd to some extem on classical and neoclassical economists in his discussion
of specious rcwards and how tu uvercome addictiun. In a recent book, he has launched the
concept of picoeconomics to designate economics within an individual (AINSLIE [1992J.
There has been a remarkable lack of interest among psychologists for dealing with economie
issues and even more so, trying to learn from economic research. One teason for the lack of
interest in economic theory may primarily relate to the fact that most psychologists dislike the
rationality concept. This may have kept psychologists fmm studying economic behavior which
in principle should be at least as interesting as other behavior. The laws governing behavior
are presumably valid also for economic behavior. The question then becomes one of the
researcher's interest in confitming fmdings in a specific area about which slhe knows little artd
which is the guarded specialty of another discipline. Those psychologists who have been
interested in economic behavior have seen it as an ar~ea of application rather than basic
research and many of them have been attracted by business as consultants and employees ever
since the beginning of this century.
Psychology is not an integrated science with a dominating research paradigm such as in
economics. There are conflicting paradigms, sometimes still called "schools", and there is a
focus on developing theory for limited behavioral areas rather than for behavior in general.
Earlier on the majority of psychologists probably had a basic training in experimental psycholo-
gy with an emphasís on methodology. Nowadays the basic training seems to vary much more
and there is more of an early specialization. Economic psychology is still a too rare option
among specializations offered to psychology students. For economists who are looking for
complementary training in psychological research there are also very few opportunities. The
International Association for Research in Economic Psychology (IAREP) arranges annual
meetings and with some intervals summer schools to encourage psychologists and economists
to undertake interdisciplinary research on economic behavior.
THE CURRENT ROUTES IN ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
What is [he present status of psychology and economics? In the next section, glimpses of
n~u;arch in econumic psycholugy will be given. lt should be rtoted that although much of' the
research noted here has appeared under the label of economic psychology, being published in
e.g. the Journal of Economic Psychology, as doctoral dissertations or in books with economic
psychology as part of the title or subtitle, some of the research relating to economics and
psychology is innocent of this label. It must be admitted that much of this research is not
ordinarily classified as belonging to economic psychology. Much of the research in economic
psychology concerns consumer behavior. Since there are many good overviews of consumer
behavior research, although, being written by U.S. authors they tend to neglect European
rt~search, I shall not deal with this research (see e.g.ROBERTSON and KASSARJIAN [1991j).
An cxcellent survcy uf psychological research relating to economic issues is given by LANE
[1991~ who proposes new dimensions in the study of the market economy. Developments in
areas relating to macroeconomic problems will be dealt with in the first place: expectations,
consumer satisfaction, saving behavior, tazation, entrepreneurship, and time preferences.
Expectations in Macroeconomic Psychology
KATONA's [1975J measurement of financial expectations has proved its mettle and ability to
survive. The "Index of Consumer Sentiment" (which is now usually called "Index of Consumer
Expectations") was introduced in the late 1940's and is still, with minor modifications, used in
many countries. The reason for its survival is obviously its ability to predict in a useful manner
certain economic developments related to turning points in the business cycle. It is capable of15
short-term predictions of changes in interest rates (as far as six months ahead), changes in tbe
Consumer Price Index (three months ahead) and changes in the unemployment rate (nine
months ahead) (CURTTN [1992]). There is some divergence of opinion about the use of the
Index in time-series analysis. There are examples of significant contributions to explaining
variance in savings and consumer durable sales over time, when the measures are combined
with economic variables in multiple regression equations of time-series data (BIART and
PRAET [ 1987[; van RAAIJ and G[ANOTTEN [ 1990]). There are also examples of failures to
explain any significant portion of the variance in sales of durables and in savings (for an
overview see VANDEN ABEELE [1988J). On the whole, the acceptance of the Index for
short-run forecasts is high and the Index is often cited in the mass media.
In economic psychology, expectations are seen as partly based on previous experience, partly
on new information. When little new information is attended to, the past experience dominates.
When new information of import is received, it determines the expectations (van RAAIJ
[1989]). These hypotheses were derived from psychological theory of problem solving by
KATONA [1975] and they were tested on data from many surveys. In economics, rational ex-
pectations theory is based on the use of the best available information which in MUTH's
[ 1961] original formulation was expressed as follows: ".. expectations, since they are informed
predictions of future events, are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant
economic theory." The theory involves an extension of the rationality concept to expectations.
While the rational expectations theory has had enormous influence on financial economics and
macrceconomics (see e.g. KLAMER [1984], there is still a wide gap between the empirical
measurements of information and expectations in economic psychology and this theory. Some
of the ideas associated with the theory could probably be put to productive use in the study of
actual expectations and behavior, such as the assumptions of arbitrage effects.
The mass media, through reporting on ill events and signs of poor prospects, are assumed to
build up expectations, especially of an impoverished future (van RAAU [1989]). KATONA
(1975) suggested that in some cases a social learning process was started in which a large
number of people were simultaneously reached by important information and reacted in the
same fashion. What the mass media reported could have great influence on such social
learning. Such effects could not be explained or foreseen on the basis of economic theories of
expectations according to Katona and this was a reason for frequent measurements of
consumer and business expectations.
Only a few studies exist of the correlation between mass media reports and economic
developments. Katona's evidence was mostly indirect. An overview is given by van RAAIJ
[1989]. He concludes that there is of[en an overinterpretation of tendencies: "If reporters
interpret random and~or minor deviations from the trend as structural treads attributing the
deviation to internal causes, people generally will form or revise expectations based on this
information. Both mass media reporters and the public at large will base their conclusions on
imperfect informa[ion." (van RAAIJ [1989,490]). An interesting study of how headlines
rclxirting violerxc un thc front page of the New York Times correlated with department store
sales in New York, can serve as an example of how such studies can be done. SCHACHTER
et al. [1986, 240] found that the more violence was reported, the smaller were the sales. Having
carefully checked for other possible explanations, the authors concluded "..we are inclined to
accept the interpretation that reports of violence in the mass media can create a community-
wide state of uneasiness sufficient to affect department store sales." In another study they
investigated fluctuations on the New York Stock Exchange and found that emotions, induced
by such factors as reports on airplane crashes and presidential elections, seemed to ezplain
certain devia[ions from market efficiency.
In a Dutch study, van VELDHOVEN and KEDER [1988] found quite high correlatioac
between newspaper economic news and the Index of Consumer Sentiment in the Netherlands.16
"I'hcir tenuctive cunc;lusion was that there was in particular an influence of negative news. What
constituted positive news was somewhat more puzzling. It seemed as though the absence of
economic news sometimes had a positive effect on expectations. Using the concept "pessimistic
rumination", ZULLOW [1991] tested media influence on consumer optimism or pessimism and
on economic growth. He carried out content analyses of pessimistic themes in popular music
and in Time magazine and found that there was a correlation with the Index of Cottsumer
Sentiment and the Gross National Product. Moreover, he traced a time sequence with popular
songs as the first step or indication of growing pessimism in the U.S.A., followed by changes
in the Index and later in GNP.
Whereas the Index of Consumer Expectations is based on a few simple interview questions
asking about changes in the present and the future firtancial status ofthe household and of the
national economy, studies of perceptions and expectations of inflation often ask for quantitative
estimates. In general, people seem to have a fairly good grasp of how much prices have
increased during the last year (JONUNG [1981]; BLOMQVIST [1983]; W,~IRNERYD and
WAHLUND [1985]; BATCHELOR [986]). When asked about coming price level changes over
the next twelve months, people on average seem to be able to make reasottably good predic-
tions. Although many respondents in a survey hesitate to make any prediction, those who do,
in some cases provide an average estimate that is amazingly close to the actual development
(as assessed after twelve months). The way the questions are asked appears to be of great
importance. When people are asked how much the prices of certain goods have gone up or
how the price uf a basket of goods has changed the results are much less accurate. HUDSON
[1989J concluded that there are two sets of inflation expectations. One is based on direct
experience of price changes and can be measured in surveys through asking questions about
price changes for shopping baskets of goods. The second set derives from information about
price changes received from the mass media and from o[her people. It is covet~ed through
questions about percentage changes in price levels. On average the indit~ect estimates tettd to
be much closer to reality than the direct ones which wildly overestimate price rises.
Consumer Well-Being and Satisfaction
Much research in economic psychology has been devoted to questions of well-being (e.g.
STRUMPEL [1974] and [1976]; for a report on a program of research see GROENLAND
[ 1989]). A particular aspect isconsumer satisfaction or rather dissatisfaction, since many studies
have fcx;used on consumer complaints (HUNT [1991]). Recently, FORNELL [1992]; see also
JOHNSON and FORNELL [1991]) has shown that it is possible to consttuct an index of
consumer satisfaction for various industries. The Consumer Satisfaction Barometer (CSB) is
a mcasurc at thc aggrcgate Icvel. It has sofar nut been related to macrueconumic issues, but
could conceivably develop into something similar to the Index of Consumer Expectations. The
CSB has been tried out in Sweden and reports on customer satisfaction in over 30 industries
and for over 100 corporations (FORNELL [1992]). It involves measuring the quality of the
marketing of goods and services and captures (1) general satisfaction, (2) confirmation of
expectations about the properties of goods and services, and (3) the distance from the
customer's hypothetical ideal product. The analysis reported shows how the CSB is related to
customer loyalty and market share.
Saving Behavior
Much of the differences in saving between countries and over time periods can be explaitted
by economic and demographic factors, but there still remains a role for psychological reseanch
to play. The fact that at every level of income there are people who save and people who do
not save illustrates that economic and demographic variables may not tell the whole truth. The
psychology of saving was for long solely the concem of economists who attributed saving to a
quality called "thrift". Classical and neo-classical economists devoted a lot of interest to factors17
that influenced thrift (for a review, see WpiRNERYD [1989]). It was suggested that impatience
and lack of self-control were important factors and it was assumed that such factors were
associated with low education, low income, and low age. Some economists provided rather
elaborate psychological theories which were quite different fmm what the contemporary
psychologists were busy studying.
Survey-based research on saving started in the 1940'sunder the leadership of George Katona.
This rescarch established a paradigm for asking people about their savings, saving attitudes and
saving motives that has later been adopted by economists in many countries. More recently,
a number ofeconomic psychologists have turned their attention to the study of saving behavior.
~LANDER and SEIPEL [1970] presented a behavioral model of saving behavior with a highly
cognitive texture. It was based on the decision making process. The primary purpose for this
model was to dovetail results from empirical studies and to note where there were major gaps
in the research. They found that there were actually very few attempts to study psychological
variables in the context of saving behavior except for the work carried out and inspited by
George Katona. The second purpose was for the model to guide further research. JULANDER
[1975] and LINDQVIST [1981] used the model as a starting point for their empirical studies
of saving behavior and developed simpler versions of it.
Survey studies have asked about saving motives much along the lines suggested by early
economists like FISHER [1930]. A consistent finding is the great importance of saving to have
a buffer ("the notorious rainy day" in Fisher's tenns). More recently, the idea of saver groups
who may respond differently to economic stimuli has been introduced. WAHLUND and
Wi~RNERYD [1987] suggest the existence of four saver types: wealth managers, goal savers,
buffer savers, and cash managers. The groups are characterized by their main motives for
saving. Cluster analyses of Swedish survey data support the meaningfulness of the categories.
Knowing something about the properties of these groups, the potential consequences of, for
example, a tax incentive plan for stimulating saving can be appmached more meaningfully than
if all savers are treated as one aggregate.
Researchers in economic psychology have over the last few years displayed an ilxreasing
interest in the study of saving and also of debt (see e.g. LIVINGSTONE and LUNT [1992].
Laboratory experiments, with high mundane realism, have been introduced as a way ofstudying
children's saving (WEBLEY et aL [1991]. Judging fmm papers read at the most recent annual
conferences in economic psychology, many studies that are under way involve developments
of new models for explaining the psychology of saving. Some of the pmjects make serious
attempts to combine economic and psychological thinking. RITZEMA [1992] is an example.
The life-cycle hypothesis is the object of continuous reseatch efforts with the purpose of
making its explanations and predictions better. One rype of effort involves using psychological
theory. A recent example is given by SHEFRIN and THALER [1988] who present the
behavioral life-cycle hypothesis. The latter stresses the importance for saving of individual self-
control, self-imposed rules and precommitments. It has succeeded in stimulating saving
research that includes measures of self-control, the use of inental accounts and time horizons.
Taxation
Thc commercc between the taxpayer and the tax au[horities has attracted a lot of research
interest (see LEWIS [1982]; The Journal of Economic Psychology, special issues May 1982 and
December 1992). Tax evasion has received mos[ attention, but there are also studies of how
work motivation is affected by taxes (CALDERWOOD and WEBLEY [1992]; von
GRUMBKOW and Wf1RNERYD [1986]) and studies of the effects of changes in tax systems
(WAHLUND [1992]; SCHOLZ et al. [1992]).18
Psychological theories of various kind have been employed to explain tax evasion. Prospect
theory predicts that paying money to make up for insufficient pay-as-you-eatn tax is a problem
that leads to more tax evasion than ifthe taxpayer expects return of money (ROBBEN [1991]).
liyuity thcury has Ix:cn invuked to explain why people evade taxes. Some taxpayers may have
a feeling that, after tax, they are not equitably recompensed for their work. W~IRNERYD and
WALERUD [1982] found some support for the idea in their data which came from a
representative sample of Swedish men and among other things involved the endorsement of
attitude statements relating to inequity. COWELL [1992] submits that there is enough
substance in earlier findings to make it wotthwhile to include equitylinequity in a formal
model of tax evasion.
WAHLUND [1989] reports on perceptions of tax changes after a change in the Swedish tax
system 1983-1985. He found that there was a delay in perceptions of lowered income taxes and
that the changes were perceived to be very small. The effects of the tax system change on self-
reported tax evasion were negligible (WAHLUND [1992]).In their research on the U.S.A.Tax
Reform Act of 1986, SCHOLZ et aL [1992,653] found that there was a relatively weak linkage
between objective changes and subjective responses. Other influences played a major role in
shsiping respcroses to the tax reform. "In particular, prior attitudes of the individual toward the
statc and thc altitudcs of others with whom the individual talks--legitimacy atxl discussion--
influence evaluations and changes in attihtde independently of the objective impacts of refortn
on the individual." The rather complex analyses give a clear indication that psychological
variables are essential for understanding and possibly predicting the outcome of a tax refotm.
The authors present a cognitive model that neatly disentangles the complex set of influences.
A group of researchers in economic psychology at Erasmus University Rotterdam (HESSING
et al. [1988]) have carried out an ambitious program of researeh on tax evasion. They have
proposed a socialpsychological model that explains tax evasion and they have shown empirical
support for the model. The model explains tax evasion in terms of situational and personal
instigations and constraints (WEIGEL et al. [1987]). On the basis of their experiments
comparing lax evasion assessed by tax auditors with self-reported tax evasion they question the
uu; ofsclf-reports (ELFFERS [1991];ROBBEN [1991]).Their conclusion after reviewing their
own and others' efforts to assess tax evasion is worth noting: "Tax evasion is a highly complex
behavioural act which is fragmented over many different periods in a tax year, based on
different detailed aspects of tax obligations, occurring in different spheres of life, and under
everchanging situational, economic, fiscal, social and psychological conditions. Last but not
least, it occurs with changing and multifaceted levels of conscious intentions to comply or
evade." (ELFFERS et al. [1992,564]). The sad conclusion is that it is not feasible to capture
all essential aspects of tax evasion through simple measurements.
Entrepreneurship
The study of entrepreneurship has attracted many researchers, comparatively few of them
psychologists (see BROCKHAUS [1982]; WÁRNERYD [1988]). There is no specifically
psychological theory of entrepreneurship, but elements of several theories are used in the study
of entrepreneurship. There is, for example, Atkinson's theory of achievement motivation
(ATKINSON [ 1957], [1964]) and MCCLELLAND's [1961], [1975] work on need achievement
ancf the power motive. In MCCLELLAND [1961] aggregate measures of achievement
motivation, assessed through content analyses of children's books, were correlated with
macroeconomic measures ofeconomic activity. Entrepreneurs are according to McClelland and
his followers characterized by high need achievement implying that they tend to choose tasks
(activities) with moderate probabilities of success, in laboratory studies approximated as
p-0.50. They want to succeed and they want to be proud of their achievements which they
cannot tx; if the success is too easily won. If, on the other hand, the task is too difficult, they
may not Ix: able to succeed without the help of some luck.19
According to MCCLELLAND and WINTER [1969], Atkinson's model implies that if
Government can increase the probability of success for business firms from low to moderate,
the high need achievers who have the highest potential for entrepreneurship will be attracted
to business. So will also the low need achievers, but not to the same extent. If high fear of
failure prevails, however, the effects will rather be for people to leave business, if the
probability of success increases from low to moderate. If the probability of success increases
from moderatc to high, high need achievers will find business uninteresting and seek other
challenges with moderate levels of success probabili[ies. Those with high fear of failure will be
attracted since they see chances of being successful. The effects of fittancial suppor[, i.e.
creating opportunities, will depend on the psychological characteristics of the population.
Psychological variables are essential for understanding the outcome of subsidizing programs.
A common criticism is that psychological variables have not proved that they can contribute
substantially to explaining variations in entrepreneurship. It is said that structural variables
belonging to the environment are more important. A conclusion that lies near at hand is that
variables belonging to the environment, usually called structural or system variables, and
psychological variables must be combined in the analysis of entrepreneurship. Certain types of
motivation which may be related to personality characteristics must be combined with cognitive
I'actors and tx: asxumed to operate under certain situational circumstances. DAVIDSSON
~1989J presents a structural equation model which in its essentials is qui[e simple and still
seems to provide a good structure for an analysis of entrepreneurship problems and policy
measures to stimulate entrepreneurship.
The model has the following components. There are three objectively defined factors: ability,
need, and opportunity, all of them defined in tetms of objective indicators. In the model they
are combined with the corresponding subjective variables: perceived ability, perceived need,
and perceived opportunity. These variables are measured through subjective report from the
individual. Together they influence a fourth subjective variable: entrepreneurial motivation. All
of the variablcs contribute to the dependent variable "observed entrepreneurship". The model
mixes objective, structural data with subjective data of cognitive and motivational phenomena.
The model has been empirically tested on what the author calls "continued entrepreneurship",
i.e. the growth of small firms. The empirical tests so far indica[e that the model has good
explanatory power. The author summarizes his findings as follows (DAVIDSSON [1989,210]):
"Objective measures of Ability, Need, and Opportunity are capable of explaining a substantial
share of the variation in past growth rates. Need factors appear relatively more important than
the other two. The results also leave considerable room for explanations based on the
manager's subjectively perceived Ability, Need, and Opportunity."
The Study of Time Preferences
Jevons, Biihm-Bawerk and Marshall, all stressed that the value of a future good decreased very
rapidly with the first lapse of time and then more slowly. B~HM-BAWERK [1888] said that
in particular when the undervaluation (or lower evaluation of the future good) was caused by
defects of will, there might be a strong difference between an enjoyment which offered itself
at the very moment, and one which did not. There was, however, only a small or no difference
between an enjoyment which was pretty far away, and one which was farther away. The
decreasing value of an object with inereasing remoteness in future time, is in economics
expressed as an exponential function with a constant discount factor. Self-control was by the
early economists considered to be an important factor for explaining saving behavior. The
degree of self-control can be conceptualized as degree of time preference. Persons with low
self-control are assumed to have a strong preference for the present. They can be said to ask
a high interest rate in their discount functions for future events or in more psychological terms
be impatient. A common assumption is that discount functions fall very rapidly at first and then
level off in the long run.20
MARSHALL [1890I1947,225] wrote: " Cases are not rare of inen who alternate between
earning two or three pounds a week and being reduced to the verge of starvation: the utility
of a shilling to them when they are in employment is less than that of a penny when they are
out of it, and yet they never attempt to make provision for the time of need." In a footnote he
addcJ: "'I'hcy 'Jiu:uunt' lhc futurc tx;itelits....at thc rale ol' many thousaruls per ccnt per
annum. "
In a study of Dutch households, ANTONIDES [1988] found that there were actually
differences in discounting factors between people who saved and those who did not save. For
the former the (by Antonides calculated) monthly discount factor was 0.014 4b while it was
0.026~ for non-savers. Non-savers with an optimistic view of the future had the highest
discount factor: 0.035~ per month. Recent economic-psychological studies in the Netherlands
indicate that measurements of people's time preferences coturibute significantly to ezplaining
saving (RITZEMA [1992]). Time preferences were measured on a simple scale, representing
different degrees of impulsiveness-thriftiness, in an interview survey of savings and saving
habits.
The fact that people had a tendency to change their plans over time led the economist
STROTZ [ 1956] to suggest a way of describing the phenomenon of changing tastes and also
to give some advice as to how the individual could safeguard against such behavior when it was
unwanted. He proposed two ways to impose self-control so that undesirable crossings of
discount functions could be prevented. People could a) precommit themselves or b) use the
strategy ofconsistent planning. Precommitment can be exemplified by Ulysses's behavior in the
episode with the Sirens; he tied himself to the mast so that he could not yield to the tempta-
tion. The strategy of consistent planning consists in choosing the best of the plans that the
individual counts on actually being able to follow. This entails some provision against deficient
self-control in the future. Strotz, like Bóhm-Bawerk and Fisher, thought that the proper
discount functions were established early in life through the teaching of parents and through
social pressure from the envirottment. Children and other "uninsttuctive" groups in society
were too impatient in their discounting of the future.
AINSLIE [1975], a psychiatrist, further expanded Strotz' ideas and related them to
psychological research. He described a discount futtction that strongly overvalued objects and
events that were close to the present. On the basis of psychological research, he suggested that
impulsiveness can be described in tetms of a discount function, but that the functions do not
follow the course of exponential functions with a constant exponent. He concludes that a
hyperbola, meaning that the expected value of the object divided by the time before an object
becomes available, is preferable to an exponential expression. The idea is further developed
in AINSLIE [ 1992J.
Some recent thinking and experímental work on phenomena that were in fact touched upon
by some of the classical economists have produced some hypotheses of great interest in
amnection with the characteristics of time preferences. A basic idea behind the new thinking
is that people in general prefer improvement to deterioration. They tend to order things in
such a way that a climax is reached rather than to put the best things first and risk an
anticlimax. This implies that a negative time preference tnay at least sometimes be possible
as an alternative to the generally assumed positive time preference (the strength of which is,
however, assumed to vary). Economic utility theory predicts that things are rank ordered from
most preferred to least preferred and chosen in that order, given a budget constraint.
Accordinl; tu I.OI'sWENSTIi1N [1987J and [1988],there are two kinds ofutility to coasider. the
utility derived tYom actual consumption and the utility derived from anticipating future
consumption. The latter, if positive, is called savoring and if negative, dread. When there is a
preference for an improvement order, some preferred events will be postponed and some non-21
preferred events may be wanted earlier. The latter would for example be the case if a person
waits for a painful operation: it is better to get it over with.
Summarizing the research evidence which is still rather slim, LOEWENSTEIN and PRELEC
~ 1991, 348~ state: "Savoring and dread contribute to the preference for improvement because
for gains, improving sequences allow decision makers to savor the best until the end of the
sequence. With losses, getting the worst outcomes over with quickly eliminates dread.
Adaptation and loss aversion induce preference for improvement because, over time, people
tend to assimilate to ongoing stimuli and to evaluate new stimuli relative to their assimiladon
level. Thus, changes in, rather than levels of, consump[ion are the carriers of value. Improving
scquences afliird a continual series of positive departures (gains) from one's adaptation level;
decliuing scyucnces provide a series ol' relative losses."
The conclusions cited above seem valid for actions that are sequential rather than single: "The
differences that do prevail should instead perhaps be traced to different styles of inental
bookkeeping, which will alone produce different degrees of impatience even with a common
underlying rate of time preferettce. Any operation, custom, or habit that causes the stream of
purposeful activity to fragment into a series of isolated choices, each involving a simple
intertemporal tradeoff, and each unrelated to a larger plan, encourages impatient choices.
Whereas the integral sequence frame, by fusing events into a coherent sequence, promotes
concern for the future, thereby creating an appearance of negative time preference."
(LOEWENSTEIN and PRELEC [1991, 351]). In a t~ecent paper, LOEWENSTEIN and
PRELEC [1993] elaborate the hypothesis on negative time preference. They indicate that the
evidence so far is stronger for the existence of negative time preference when painful objects
or events are involved (dread) than when the objects or events are attractive. The improvement
order is interpreted as meaning that individuals do not want deteriorations, but rather an even
spread ofconsumption over time. This is surprisingly similar to the main assumption of the life-
cyclc hypothesis.
ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY:EVALUATIONAND OUTLOOK
The brief review of resean:h areas in economic psychology dces not do justice to the whole
gamut of research interests in economics and psychology. Hopefully, it shows enough to
indicate that there is a potential for fruitful in[erdisciplinary efforts. With respect to economics,
thc most accepted role for psychology is to furnish richer data which can be used to serve in
testing economic models. The main and primary task of economic psychology is in my view to
provide better descriptions of real economic behavior. This is similar to what SIMON [1986,
xv-xvi] says: "At the level of the business firms and the consumer, classical theory gives few
hints as to how real human beings make real decisions in a world that rarely provides them
with the data and computational resources that would be required to apply, literally, the theory
of the textbooks. We need empirically valid theories of how business organizations operate, of
how investment decisions are actually made, of how the levels of salaries and wages are deter-
mined, and of the growth and sizes of business firms." This involves constructíng empirical
theory in the spirit of George Katona rather than to try to improve economic theory by
attacking the rationality postulate, at least not in the short run. It dces not preclude further
explorations ofthe limits of rationality in real life, for example, looking at how compatible with
individual goal hierarchies behavioral acts are. The objecdves of economic psychology are then
very similar to those of behavioral economics.
Improving the prospects for economic psychology as a separate field of study will, however,
reyuire the building an economic-psychological theoretical framework tha[ to some extent can
integrate ideas and results. Macroeconomic predictions have often failed during the last
decades and there is disagreement about theories; somehow the theories do not in the public
eye live up to their pretense. Some economists suggest that descriptions and explanations at22
less aggregated levels than the macroeconomic level are necessary for arriving at better
macrceconomic explanations and predictions. There is then a quest for something like the
market segment concept used in marketing theory and marketing practice and familiar also in
economic psychology.
The fundamental idea is that there are clusters of consumers (citizens) who can share certain
characteristics while the clusters are distinct from one another. Clusters based on saving
motives were mentioned above (WAHLUND and Wr1RNERYD [1987]. In their study of
taxpayers, WÀRNERYD and WALERUD [1982] distinguished between three clusters of
taxpayers differing in their attitude towards tax evasion and in self-reported tax evasion.
Knowing some important characteristics ofeach cluster (segment) gives a better understanding
of potential reactions to tax evasion measures. Katona's ideas about the role of intervening
variables, between macrceconomic stimuli and macroeconomic reactions show some similarity
to the concept of segmentation. He distinguished between degrees of optimism-pessimism in
society. This dimension can easily be intetpreted in terms of segments--one composed of
optimists and the other of pessimists. KATONA [1975] found differences between optimists
and pcssimists in reactions to a tax cut. Changes in the size of each segment can be followed
over time through the interview surveys that are made in many countries. Reac[ions to
economic and financial policy measures can be expected to vary between segments with
different psychological characteristics.
I have said little abuut the differences in approaches and interpretations [hat despite the
prugresx ulicn charactcrir.c ccunumists' atxl psycholugists' attcntpts tu dcal with lhc
interdisciplinary problems. Economists are, for example, used to working with specified models
in mathematical form whereas psychologists tend more towards employing cruder, often verbal
models. The design and interpretation of laboratory experiments differ somewhat between the
disciplines (HEY [1992]). Concepts like expectation, attitude, risk perception and risk aversion
are denotatively and connotatively different in the two disciplines (ARROW [1982];SELTEN
[1991];SMITH [1991]).
Even when skillfully used by behavioral economists, psychology is usually given a minor role
to play. It is given a service role and is not seen as a major means of progressing. Subjective
data are at best treated as supplementary and are on the whole, in the mainstream economist's
opinion, best to avoid as unreliable. When psychologists deal with economic problems their
focus is notmally on what psychology rather than economics can get out of the study.
Researchers are in the first place interested in developing the field in which they have their
basic training. Expeditions into other disciplines are undettaken on the sole proviso that the
basic discipline profits from it. Psychologists tend to avoid economic variables that are
important to economists and economists do not use psychology to its full potential. So there
is ruom for a separate field of study in which economic and psychological thinking can be
combined: economic psychology.
Rather than being a source of critique leveled against economics, economic psychology is in
this scnse a challenge tu economics to the extent that the research can provide descriptions and
explanations of economic behavior that are better at least for some purposes than those
advanced by economic theory. For psychology, economic psychology as a separate field of study
invulves the study ofa specific category of behavior, namely economic behavior, using also non-
psychological variables and models that are derived itrom economics. It needs to be separated
out from psychology since the study presupposes consideration not only of economic as well
as psychological factors, but also some understanding of the economic research paradigm which
takes some special training.
Viewed in this way, economic psychology will not seek direct confrontation with economics of
the mainstream kind. Indirectly it may still become involved in argtunents through the23
descriptions provided. For example, many psychological studies indicate that economic
incentives in some contexts are less important than specific non-economic incentives. SEN
[1979, 101] bluntly states: "To run an organization entirely on incentives to petsonal gain is
pretty much a hopeless task. " Take the case of pollution. Many economists favor increases in
costs of pollution to keep firttts and people outside firms from polluting. On the basis of
psychological research, some authors maintain that using economic disincentives in such cases
entail cottsequences that are not wanted and that there may be non-economic incentives that
could produce better results (see e.g the review by CAPORAEL et al. [1989]; TOMER [1991])
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Research in economic psychology is carried out by economists and psychologists and by many
researchets trained in management and business administration. In eazlier centuries, thinkers
could contribute to the development of hoth economics and psychology. Bernard Maudeville,
Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and above all, John Stuart Mill, all gave important insights to
both disciplines. For the major part of the twentieth century, there have been little under-
standing and communication between the two sciences. The last few decades have again
witnessed contributions to both sciences from researchers like George Katona, Herbert Simon,
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, to name only the most outstanding among those. This
may be interpreted as a sign of increasing convergence after, say, one hundred yeats of clear
divergence.
The future of economic psychology will depend on whether there is a demand for its services.
Macroeconomic psychology, in particular, has to pmve itself. The crucial question is to what
extcnt the results are seen as interesting and useful not only by researchers but also by
practitioners in various positions. KEYNES [1936, 383-384] noted the importance to practical
men of what economists say: "At the present moment people are unusually expectant of a
more fundamental diagnosis; more particulazly ready to receive it; eager to try it out, if it
should be even plausible. But apart from this contemporary mood, the ideas of economists and
political philosophets, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful
than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influettces, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist." "..for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are
not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age,
so that the ideas which civil servants atà politicians and even agitatots apply to cutrent events
are not likely to be the newest."
I have focussed on macroeconomic psychology sittce I think that this area is most in need of
encouragement. After all, the usefulness of psychological research in matters pertaining to the
micro level, especially the consumer choice of products, is well established. It is comparatively
easy for a reseancher to make a good career if sltte specializes in the mictroeconomic
psychology of consumer behavior. There is a demand for such research from practitioners and
from other disciplines relating to management. There is less demattd for macropsychological
research on economic behavior, even resistance to the whole idea. The ideas of some defunct
economists may be an e~umbrance not only to practitioners, but also to theoreticians. Who
listens to a psychologist when slhe is talking about economic affaits? The answer is now that
there is some listening and even requests for opinions and infotma[ion directed to economic
psychologists: there is some realization that psychological factors affecting economic behavior
can be fruitfully studied and commented on not only by economists, but also by (some)
psychologists. It is essential that there be a demand for more complex and thus interdisciplinary
answers to economic questions and the insight that segments of the population, differing with
respect to psychological properties must often be examined to answer apparently macro level
questions.24
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